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Private information induces individuals to self-select as subjects into clinical
research trials, and it induces researchers to select which trials they conduct. We
show that selection can induce ex ante therapeutic misconception and ex post
disappointment among research subjects; and it undermines it the rationale of
collective equipoise as an ethical basis for clinical trials. Selection provides a
reason to make non-trivial payments to subjects and it implies that researchers
should not design experiments to maximize statistical power.
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I. Introduction
In empirical work, selection bias is consistently one of the greatest challenges
to researchers. It undermines the inferences we make in several ways: it makes
treatments endogenous, it affects who we observe in a sample and who we do not,
and it even affects the research we choose to undertake. Clinical trials have long
dealt with the first consequence of selection bias by using trials in which
treatments are allocated at random. But there has been little progress in dealing
with other types of selection. In this paper we explore the consequences of two
types of selection in clinical trials: of subjects into trials on the basis of private
information, and of researchers into trials on the basis of information unobserved
by the profession at large.
These selection problems have important consequences for some deeply-held
attitudes about which trials are ethical to conduct, and the manner in which they
should be conducted. In particular, selection by subjects generates ex ante
therapeutic misconception and ex post disappointment about the personal benefit
from participating in trials, and it provides a rationale for making payments to
subjects that are likely to be much larger than has been the norm. Selection of
researchers undermines the rationale for collective equipoise coexisting with trials
that are designed to maximize statistical power. If collective equipoise is to be
maintained as an ethical basis for deciding which trials can be conducted, then it
is unethical to maximize statistical power; if maximizing statistical power is to be
maintained as the basic criterion for experimental design, then collective
equipoise is unethical.
Although selection by subjects and by researchers are clearly closely related
issues, it is useful to explore their implications separately. In the introduction, we
begin the paper as we mean to go on. In Section A we discuss further the
1

problem

of

selection

by

subjects,

the

therapeutic

misconception,

and

disappointment. In Section B we discuss selection by researchers and the
collective equipoise problem.
A. Self-Selection by Subjects, the Therapeutic Misconception, and Disappointment
It is widely understood among members of the profession that the ethics and
practice of clinical research and ordinary clinical care are fundamentally different.
When subjects do not understand this, it is known as the therapeutic
misconception (Appelbaum, Roth and Lidz [1982]). Therapeutic misconceptions
arise when subjects transfer their expectation that physicians will act in the
patient’s best interest from a clinical setting to a research setting (Appelbaum
[2002]); because they do not understand the concept of randomization (Kerr et al.
[2004]); because they do not understand the constraints imposed on treatments
offered during trials (Dresser [2002]); or because they have an overwhelming
psychological need to believe that participation will yield personal benefits
(Appelbaum et al. [1982]). The combined effect of these disparate influences is
that subjects’ subjective expectations of the personal benefit of participation
exceeds the mathematical expectations.
The therapeutic misconception conflicts directly with the principle of respect
for persons as expressed in the requirement of informed consent from voluntary
participants. Nonetheless, as Dresser [2002] has noted, researchers have in
practice tolerated therapeutic misconceptions as an inevitable consequence of
conducting trials. Some have gone so far as to promote them (e.g. Truog et al.
[1999]). However, a number of proposals have been offered to attenuate the
therapeutic misconception, including the use of a “neutral discloser” (Appelbaum
et al. [1982]), changes to consent forms (Appelbaum [1996], Moreno et al. [1998]),
changes in advertising (Miller and Shorr [1999]), changes in the way physicians
2

recruit subjects (Kass et al. [1996]), and requiring physicians to disclose to their
patients payments they are receiving for recruiting subjects (Berg [1997]).
In many practical settings, these proposed solutions can only make limited
progress. When the efficacy of an experimental treatment varies among
individuals, self-selection into trials by individuals who are at least partiallyinformed ensures that subjects correctly expect to reap a personal benefit.
However, under two reasonable scenarios, subjects that do not suffer therapeutic
misconception in the original sense proposed by Appelbaum et al. [1982] will
continue to expect, or give the appearance of expecting, personal benefits that
exceed the true expectation.
For both scenarios we consider a setting in which researchers and potential
subjects have prior beliefs about the individual benefit that will arise from
participating in an experiment. The priors for both groups have zero mean. When
a potential subject is given an opportunity to join a trial, she also receives a
private signal about the personal benefit of participation. With the signal she
updates her beliefs, and joins the trial if her posterior mean is positive. In the
first scenario, the potential subject’s beliefs are formed efficiently (i.e. by
Bayesian means), so that, whether or not she decides to join, her subjective mean
is equal to the mathematical expectation conditional on the signal. However,
researchers do not observe the private signal because they have only limited
information about the subject, and so their belief remains unchanged from the
prior.1 When researchers subsequently compare their expectation about the

1

Subjects may have found that existing treatments have not worked for them, or that

they had unusually severe side effects. Chard and Lilford [1998] point out that most
treatments involve a vector of characteristics and how these are weighted depends on
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personal benefit with the expectations of their subjects, they conclude that every
single subject suffers from the therapeutic misconception. In reality, no one does.
In the second scenario, potential subjects are not efficiently Bayesian. The
key assumption we make is that individuals are overconfident about the accuracy
of signals they receive, in the sense that they believe noisy signals indicating the
benefit from participation to be more accurate than they really are.2 In this
scenario, subjects revise their beliefs too much in response to the signal. Although
the average subjective posterior mean of all individuals is unbiased, self-selection
into trials by individuals that received a positive signal implies that every
subjects’ posterior means exceeds the true conditional expectation. Researchers,
whether they observe the signal or not, will again conclude that subjects suffer
from the therapeutic misconception. In this case they are correct.
The second scenario is clearly of more concern. When individuals are
overconfident they are not capable of providing informed consent, even though
they make use of all information available to them. Absent conscious intervention
to tackle the problem, the therapeutic bias vanishes only at the extremes when
subjects are either completely uninformed or perfectly informed. The former

patient preferences.
2

There is an extensive and convincing psychological literature supporting the assumption

of overconfidence about the accuracy of private information. It has been found in
numerous experimental settings (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips [1982], Yates
[1990]), and in many professional fields (see Odean [1998] and Barber and Odean [2001]
for extensive references). The idea has since been fruitfully applied to applications in
finance (De Long et al. [1991], Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam [1998], Kyle and
Wang [1997], Odean [1998], entrepreneurship (Klepper and Thompson [2005]), and
auction theory (Compte [2004]).

4

extreme hardly seems a desirable way to eliminate the therapeutic bias; the latter
hardly seems feasible.
It is important to distinguish between the therapeutic misconception and the
better-known concept of the winner’s curse. We have interpreted the therapeutic
misconception as being a state in which a subject’s expectation exceeds the
mathematical

expectation.

The

winner’s

curse,

which

we

will

call

“disappointment” here to distinguish it from settings in auction theory, exists
when a subject’s expectation exceeds the realized benefit of participation. We will
show that selection alone induces disappointment on average. However,
overconfidence exacerbates the problem.3
Section II of the paper formalizes these ideas. We then show that in many
settings a simple solution is to offer a significant monetary payment for
participation. This finding is incompatible with the widespread practice of
offering only token compensation, apparently because of concerns that sizeable
payments might be “coercive”, or might undermine altruistic motivations to
participate. However, we are not the first to propose large payments to tackle the
therapeutic misconception. Dickert and Grady [1999] have argued that payments
would serve to “remind” subjects that participation provides service to others
rather than to the subject. While our case for payments is different, it
complements their proposal.
B. Self-Selection by Researchers and Clinical Equipoise
The prevailing view among ethicists is that clinical trials should be

3

Compte [2004] has employed a similar idea to generate the winner’s curse from private

value Vickrey auctions.
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conducted only under conditions of equipoise. Individual equipoise exists when a
rational informed person has no preference between two treatments, say an
established treatment and an experimental treatment. Collective equipoise exists
when the profession as a whole has no clear preference for one treatment over
another. Under collective equipoise, individuals may have distinct preferences but
differing preferences approximately cancel each other out (Johnson, Lilford, and
Brazier [1991], Gifford [1995]). The notion of equipoise underlies the 1964
Declaration of Helsinki, which prohibits the use of placebos when an effective
treatment already exists, and it is a central concern of ethics committees
(Kennedy [1991]).
A case has been made that trials should be conducted only in situations of
“collective equipoise” (Freedman [1987]). It has also been argued that the Golden
rule demands that individual equipoise holds for each physician suggesting
research participation to his or her own patients (Chard and Lilford [1998]).
Thus, both collective and individual equipoise have been indicated as essential for
the ethical conduct of clinical trials.
Selection by researchers into trials undermines obtaining both collective and
individual equipoise. Collective equipoise is based on public information, most
notably the information revealed from the publication of the results of
randomized trials. But individuals conducting these trials invariably have private
information based on their specialized efforts in preliminary experimentation, and
their ongoing research into the physiology or biochemistry of possible
treatments.4 If ethical researchers select themselves into conducting promising

4

The claim that researchers have prior information is well-understood. For example

Lilford [2003, p. 980] writes that “[s]ome evidence always exists before a randomized
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experiments, and they are better informed than the collective consciousness, then
it must be the case that collective equipoise is consistent with a positive expected
benefit of a new treatment.
Section III analyses the causes and consequences of selection by researchers.
We assume that a researcher is faced with a sequence of research opportunities,
but resource constraints prevent her from pursuing all of them. Collective
equipoise requires that the benefit of innovative treatments (relative to a placebo
or existing treatment, as appropriate) embodied in each of these opportunities
has prior mean zero.5 Accompanying each opportunity, the researcher receives a
private signal about the expected benefit. In this setting, the researcher only
initiates projects for which her posterior mean is strictly positive. That is, if there
is collective equipoise, there cannot be individual equipoise. To restore individual
equipoise, ethics committees must be willing to approve trials on innovative
treatments for which the (collective) prior mean is negative.
We also explore one important implication of selection. If collective equipoise
is maintained as an ethical criterion, selection by better-informed researchers into
experiments on treatments for which there is collective equipoise undermines the

clinical trial is done: in vitro and animal experiments, the same treatment in other
diseases, similar treatments in the same disease, and perhaps even randomized clinical
trials done elsewhere. Thus clinicians have some idea of what treatments might
accomplish, even in advance of a trial.” The consequences of this prior information for
selection does not appear to be so well understood.
5

This is an excessively precise interpretation of collective equipoise convenient for

modeling. It ignores what Chard and Lilford [1998, p.898)] have called the “fuzzy
boundary of appreciation of numeric concepts inherent in human behavior.”
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case for experimental designs that maximize statistical power. Instead,
experimental designs should reflect prior information held by researchers, trading
statistical power against the expected net benefits for subject participants. How
we should go about doing this depends critically on how we choose to weight the
short-term benefits for participants against possible future benefits for society.
We do not attempt to resolve that issue in this paper, which is outside the scope
of formal economic analysis. However we do explore the factors that affect
optimal experimental design conditional on any given set of weights.

II. Self-Selection by Subjects
When an individual is faced with an opportunity to participate in a trial, it
comes accompanied by a signal, ζ, which is positively correlated with the private
benefit of participation. If she chooses to participate in the trial she receives a
benefit b. The benefit has unconditional distribution F(b), with zero expectation
and domain b , b  . Clearly, for a non-degenerate distribution we must have
b < 0 and b > 0 . The individual’s subjective belief about b after observing the

signal is given by the conditional distribution, F (b | ζ ) , which is decreasing in ζ
for all b. Hence, E [b | ζ ] is increasing in ζ. The subjective posterior distribution
and mean may differ from the Bayesian posteriors, which we denote by F * (b | ζ )
and E * [b | ζ ] .
The individual will choose to participate in the trial if she received a signal
such that E [b | ζ ] ≥ 0 . If ζˆ denotes the signal that satisfies E b | ζˆ = 0 , all


subjects must have received signals, ζ ≥ ζˆ . Let G(ζ) denote the distribution of
the signal, and let G * (ζ | b) denote the (correct) conditional distribution.6 Then

6

Letting lower case letters denote the corresponding densities, Bayes’ rule gives
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the average belief of all individuals with true benefit b, is
∞

∫ E [b | ζ ] dG (ζ | b) ,
*

(1)

−∞

while the average belief of all subjects with true benefit b is
∞

1
E [b | ζ ] dG * (ζ | b) .
∫
* ˆ
1 − G (ζ | b) ζˆ

(2)

Building on Compte [2004], we make the following assumptions:
A.1

E * [ζ | b ] = b ,

A.2

E [b | ζ ] = λ(ζ )E * [b | ζ ] ,

A.3

λ(ζ ) ≥ 1 ∀ζ ≠ 0 ; λ(ζ ) = λ(−ζ ) .

Assumption A.1 says that the signal is unbiased. Assumption A.2 states that
the (possibly erroneous) subjective posterior mean can be expressed as a
proportion of the correct mathematical expectations, where the factor of
proportionality may depend on the observable ζ but not on the unobservable b.

Assumption A.3 states that deviations of the signal from the prior in either
direction induce the same degree of bias between the subjective and objective
conditional means, which ensures we do not introduce therapeutic misconception
by construction. If individuals are Bayesian, then λ(ζ ) = 1 ∀ζ . If individuals are
overconfident, then λ(ζ ) > 1 ∀ζ ≠ 0 . Given these assumptions, ζˆ = 0 .
A. The Therapeutic Misconception

It is now easy to evaluate the extent of apparent or real therapeutic

g * (ζ | b) = f * (b | ζ )g(ζ ) / f (b) .

9

misconception under the two scenarios introduced in Section IA. Consider first
the scenario in which individuals are Bayesian, but their signal is not observed by
the researcher.7 Then the researcher believes E [b ] = 0 , while the average
posterior mean of subjects is
∞

1
E * [b | ζ ] dG * (ζ | b) > 0 .
1 − G * (0 | b) ∫0

(3)

Thus, the researcher concludes there is therapeutic misconception. However, (3)
is the correct conditional expectation, so the appearance of therapeutic
misconception is spurious. Concerns about the therapeutic misconception arise in
this case only because outside observers fail to acknowledge that subjects selfselect.
In the second scenario, with overconfident individuals, average therapeutic
misconception for any given b is given by
∞

µ(b) =

1
E [b | ζ ] − E * [b | ζ ]dG * (ζ | b)
1 − G * (0 | b) ∫0

=

1
(λ(ζ ) − 1) E * [b | ζ ]dG * (ζ | b)
1 − G * (0 | b) ∫0

∞

>0.

(4)

In this case, the apparent therapeutic misconception is real.
In general, the function λ(ζ ) will depend on both the prior distribution of b
and the distribution of the signal. To investigate how these distributions affect
the severity of the therapeutic misconception, it is useful to turn to a specific

7

We can readily extend the analysis to allow researchers to observe the signals with

noise. The same implications follow, however.
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example. Hence, assume that F(b) is normal with mean zero and variance σb2 ,8
and that ζ = b + ε , where ε ∼ N (0, σε2 ) . Then, given a signal, ζ, the conditional
expectation is
E * [b | ζ ] =

σb2ζ
.
σb2 + σε2

(5)

We assume that the subjective posterior mean is given by
E [b | ζ ] =

σb2ζ
,
σb2 + λ−1σε2

(6)

for some constant λ>1. Conditional on b, G * (ζ | b) ∼ N (b, σε2 ) , while the
unconditional distribution of the signal is G (ζ ) ∼ N (0, σb2 + σε2 ) . Then, the
average therapeutic misconception for all individuals with true benefit b and
entry threshold ζˆ is

µ(b) =

∞

(λ − 1)σb2σε2

(1 − G (ζˆ | b))(λσb2 + σε2 )(σb2 + σε2 ) ∫ζˆ
*

ζdG * (ζ | b) > 0 ,

(7)

while the average therapeutic misconception over all subjects is
∞

µ≡

∫

µ(b)dF (b) =

−∞

(λ − 1)σb2 σε2

(1 − G(ζˆ))(λσ

2
b

+ σε2 )(σb2 + σε2 )

∞

∫ ζdG(ζ ) > 0 .

(8)

ζˆ

In this setting, the correct threshold is again ζˆ = 0 , but it is useful not to impose
this for now so we can assess the effect of ζˆ on the size of the therapeutic
misconception.9

8

That is, the interval [ b , b ] → (−∞, ∞) .

9

For example, if there is a cost, c, (in time, travel, discomfort, etc.) of participating, then
ζˆ = ζˆ(c ) is increasing in c.
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µ
µ(b)

ζˆ

0

b

0

µ

µ
µ
0

σε2

0

σb2

1

λ

FIGURE 1. Comparative statics of average therapeutic misconception

among subjects.

It is straightforward to assess the effects of parameter changes by evaluating
(7) and (8). Figure 1 summarizes the effects with representative plots. The
function µ(b) is monotonically increasing, and therapeutic misconception exists
for all values of b. Somewhat surprisingly, then, the greater the true benefit for
any given individual, the greater the therapeutic misconception. This arises
because

the

term

E * [b | ζ ]

is

stochastically

increasing

in

b,

so

that

(λ(ζ ) − 1)E * [b | ζ ] is also stochastically increasing. Across all subjects, µ rises
monotonically with ζˆ , reflecting the role of selection in creating the therapeutic
misconception. Given that a personal cost, c, of participation raises ζˆ , the
12

therapeutic misconception is greater in trials that impose a greater personal
burden on the subject. The function µ also rises monotonically with λ, but it is
1

−1 2

has an upper bound given by limλ →∞ µ = 2 2 σε2 (σb2 + σε2 )

π

−1 2

. Hence, the effect

of overconfidence is bounded. As confidence rises, so does the therapeutic
misconception, but only until it attains the limit when subjects disregard the
prior.
Finally, µ initially rises and then falls with increases in σb2 and σε2 ; the
numerical plots indicate that average therapeutic misconception is at its worst for
modest values of σb2 and σε2 , in both cases declining asymptotically to zero at a
very slow rate. When signals are accurate, (i.e. σε2 → 0 ), it is not possible to
overweight the signal relative to the prior, for the simple reason that the correct
posterior mean is equal to the signal. At the other end of the spectrum, when
signals

are

uninformative

overconfidence.

10

(i.e.

σε2 → ∞ )

the

signal

noise

dominates

Similarly, when there is no prior uncertainty about the benefit

(i.e. σb2 → 0 ), there is no misconception. In this case, of course, a trial would be
worthless. At the other extreme, as σb2 → ∞ , the therapeutic misconception
vanishes, again because the correct posterior mean equals the signal.
B. Disappointment

The therapeutic misconception is concerned with subjects having excessively
optimistic beliefs about the benefit of participating in a trial. Disappointment
exists when E [b | ζ ] > b . Selection alone is enough to induce disappointment

10

An alternative formulation of overconfidence has individuals believing the signal noise

to be σˆε2 , while the true noise is σˆε2 + σε2 . In this case, the therapeutic misconception
monotonically increases with σε2 .
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among subjects, because individuals that face the prospect of good outcomes but
receive misleadingly bad signals choose not to become subjects. If individuals are
Bayesian, the fact that Bayesian updating is unbiased implies

∫

∞

 E * [b | ζ ] dG * (ζ | b) − b  dF (b) = 0 ,
∫

−∞


(9)

so that with selection,

∫

∞


1
*
*

 dF (b) > 0 .
−
E
b
ζ
dG
ζ
b
b
|
(
|
)
[
]


∫
* ˆ
 1 − G (ζ | b) ζˆ


(10)

However, an important consequence of overconfidence is that it increases the
likelihood that subjects will be disappointed ex post. Figure 2 plots for each b the
expected difference between posterior beliefs and the true benefit for the Bayesian
case (λ=1) and for the case in which there is overconfidence (λ>1). In both
cases, the difference is declining, but at a greater rate for the Bayesian case. In
each case, there exists a b*(λ)>1, strictly increasing in λ, such that for any
realized benefit less than b*, subjects will on average turn out to be disappointed.
Factors affecting selection and the revision of posterior beliefs will in turn
affect the average degree of disappointment. As in the previous subsection, we
can calculate for the normal case that disappointment will be more widespread
and profound in trials with more overconfident subjects, that impose greater
personal costs on subjects, and that have intermediate values of σb2 and σε2 .
C. Attenuating Therapeutic Misconception and Disappointment

There

are

several

ways

in

which

therapeutic

misconception

and

disappointment can be attenuated or, in some cases, eliminated. First, subjects
could be kept completely uninformed. Doing so equates the prior and posterior
14

E * E [b | ζ ; λ ] − b

Therapeutic misconception
Ex post disappointment

0

b

b*(λ)

b*(1)

λ>1
λ=1

FIGURE 2. Plots of

∫

∞
0

E [b | ζ ]dG * (ζ | b) − b

beliefs and eliminates selection, and in this case there is on average no
misconception and no disappointment among subjects. Second, subjects could be
kept perfectly informed. In this case, E [b | ζ ] ≡ b , so there is neither therapeutic
misconception nor disappointment. Third, it may be possible to educate potential
subjects so that overoptimism is reduced. Doing so will attenuate both
misconception and disappointment. However, even if all overoptimism was
eliminated, disappointment would continue to plague the average subject because
of selection.
A fourth alternative is to pay imperfectly informed subjects. Payment will
attenuate both the therapeutic misconception and disappointment because it
reduces selection. Let w denote the payment made to subjects, and let b continue
to denote the medical benefits accruing to participation. Then an individual will

15

choose to become a subject if she receives a signal ζ > ζˆ(w ) , where
E b | ζˆ(w ) = −w . Clearly, ζˆ(w ) is monotonically decreasing in w. Hence, the



higher the payment the less misconception and disappointment there will be.
If the support of the prior distribution, F(b), has finite lower bound, b <0,
then there exists a payment, w(b ) , increasing in b , that eliminates selection
entirely. If b → −∞ , no finite payment can eliminate selection. Nonetheless,
selection – and hence the therapeutic misconception and disappointment – can be
reduced. To attain any target level of misconception or disappointment, the
indicated payment is greater for intermediate values of σb2 and σε2 , and it is
increasing in λ and c.

IV. Self-selection by Researchers
Just as people do not become subjects at random, neither do researchers
select the trials they conduct at random. Clinical researchers behave just as do
researchers in other fields by pursuing opportunities that look most promising to
them. With the great degree of specialization in research, it is perhaps inevitable
that researchers in any particular area have considerably more information about
promising avenues than does the profession as a whole. In this section, we show
that in the presence of selection by researchers, collective equipoise in the
profession as a whole is very likely to preclude collective equipoise among
researchers as a group. To illustrate how selection of researchers can matter, we
then show how this undermining of collective equipoise in turn undermines the
rationale for designing trials to maximize statistical power.
A. Selection and Equipoise

Consider a randomized trial intended to compare an innovative treatment
16

with either an existing treatment or a placebo. The outcome for patient i
receiving treatment j is given by qij = µj + εi , where the innovative treatment,
j=1 is compared against the alternative j=0, and εi ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) . Assume that µ0
is known, and let µ = µ1 − µ0 . Collective equipoise implies that the unconditional
distribution, F(µ) has mean zero. However, when the opportunity to conduct the
trial is presented to a researcher it is accompanied by a signal, ζ ∈ ζ , ζ  , that is
as usual positively correlated with µ. The researcher has beliefs about µ given by
the conditional distribution F (µ | ζ ) . Her payoff from conducting the trial is zero
if the new treatment turns out to be no better than the existing treatment or a
placebo (i.e. if µ ≤ 0 ), and by the increasing, concave utility function, u(µ),
u(0)=0, otherwise.
A researcher facing a static choice about whether to conduct this trial will
choose to do so regardless of the signal. In that case, there is no selection and the
expected value of all trials is consistent with collective equipoise. But researchers
do not select projects in a static setting. Conducting one trial precludes, or
postpones, the pursuit of other perhaps more exciting opportunities. And in this
dynamic setting, the choice a researcher makes about any one trial does depend
on the signal she receives.
Consider the following stylized setting. A researcher can only conduct one
trial, but an opportunity is presented each period with probability φ. If the
researcher chooses to not to pursue the current opportunity, then next period she
must wait again with probability 1 − φ , while with probability φ she receives
another opportunity with signal ζ / . This is a classic optimal stopping problem.
Let θ denote the discount factor. The value of being presented with an
opportunity with signal ζ is

17

{

}

V (ζ ) = max E [u(µ) | ζ ], θ φE [V (ζ / )] + (1 − φ)ν  ,

(11)

ν = θ φE [V (ζ / )] + (1 − φ)ν 

(12)

where

is the value of not being presented with an opportunity. If the researcher chooses
to pursue the current opportunity, she receives an expected benefit of E [u(µ) | ζ ] .
Solving (12) for ν and substituting into (11) yields



θφE [V (ζ / )] 

V (ζ ) = max 
 E [u(µ) | ζ ],
.


1
−
θ
(1
−
φ
)





(13)

There is a unique signal, ζˆ , such that the researcher chooses not to conduct the
trial if and only if ζ < ζˆ . Assuming {ζ , ζ / }
are independent,
V (ζ ) = V (ζˆ) = E [u(µ) | ζˆ] for all ζ ≤ ζˆ . If ζ > ζˆ , the researcher pursues the
current opportunity and V (ζ ) = E [u(µ) | ζ ] . Hence, ζˆ satisfies
∞
 ζˆ

θφ





ˆ
ˆ
E u(µ) | ζ  ≥
E u(µ) | ζ  dG (ζ ) + ∫ E [u(µ) | ζ ]dG (ζ ) .

 1 − θ(1 − φ)  ∫ 


ζ*
−∞

(14)

A simple rearrangement yields the fundamental reservation equation for the
expected utility of conducting a trial:
θφ
E u(µ) | ζˆ ≥

 1− θ

∞

∫ (E [u(µ) | ζ ] − E u(µ) | ζˆ )dG(ζ ) .

(15)

ζˆ

Equation (15) allows a corner solution, when (15) is satisfied for ζˆ = ζ . This
possibility is more likely when the signal is known to be noisy (so prior beliefs are
not revised too drastically) or when θ or φ is small (so the option value of waiting
is limited). In this case, there is no selection, and collective equipoise holds
simultaneously for researchers and for the profession as a whole. In many cases,
18

however, we can expect an interior solution, ζˆ > ζ , for which (15) is an equality.
As the left hand side of (15) is increasing in ζˆ while the right hand side is
decreasing in ζˆ , the interior solution is unique. In this case, researchers are not
in collective equipoise as selection implies that
ζ

ζ

1
E [µ | ζ ]dG (ζ ) > ∫ E [µ | ζ ]dG (ζ ) = E [ µ ] = 0 .
1 − G (ζˆ) ∫ζˆ
ζ

(16)

The required expected utility to justify conducting the trial is increasing in θ and
φ, and hence so is ζˆ . Hence the deviation from collective equipoise among
researchers is increasing in the rate at which new opportunities for participation
arrive and in the discount factor.
To extend the analysis further, assume now that researchers can consider
new opportunities after the current trial is completed. Assume that that a trial
lasts n>1 periods, where n is an i.i.d. draw. The value function in this case is
given by

{

V (ζ , n ) = max E [u(µ) | ζ ] + θn φE [V (ζ / , n / )] + (1 − φ)ν  ,



}

θ φE [V (ζ /, n / )] + (1 − φ)ν  . (17)




Following the same steps as previously, the reservation equation satisfies

(θ − θ ) φ
E u(µ) | ζˆ(n ) =
EV ζ /, n / .


1−θ
n

As

{n, n }
/

and

{ζ, ζ } are
/

(

)

(18)

pairs of independent r.v.s and θ ∈ [0,1] , the right

hand side of (18) is strictly increasing in n. Hence ζˆ(n ) is strictly increasing in n,
so that the deviation from collective equipoise is greater among researchers
conducting long trials.
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B. Selection and Statistical Power

Clinical researchers must balance diverse concerns in the conduct of trials.
On the one hand, they should be concerned that the scientific value of the trial
be as great as possible. On the other, they should be concerned with the welfare
of subjects. Equipoise allows researchers to avoid a potential conflict between
these concerns. The scientific value of research is enhanced by, inter alia, greater
statistical power of an experimental design. Equipoise allows researchers to design
a trial to maximize statistical power without facing a conflict with concern for
the welfare of subjects. However, when researchers are not in equipoise, the
conflict is not so readily avoided. Concern for the expected welfare of subjects
leads the researcher to prefer that a greater fraction of subjects receive the
treatment about which the researchers is optimistic. Unfortunately, doing so
reduces statistical power.
To see this, consider again the clinical trial setting described in the previous
subsection, and assume again that the unconditional distribution, F(µ) has mean
zero. Selection now implies that, while researcher beliefs are F (µ | ζ ) , the domain
is reduced to ζ ∈ ζˆ, ζ  , and E [µ ] > 0 for each researcher. Finally, although the


researcher has beliefs governed by Bayesian thinking, she follows norms in the
profession and compares means with classical statistics.
Let n denote the sample size and let ρ denote the fraction of the sample
assigned to the innovative treatment. The power, β, of a t-test for a difference in
means with size five percent, as measured by the z score, is
z 1−β = −1.96 +

ρ(1 − ρ) n µ
σ

.

(19)

which, regardless of beliefs about µ, is maximized by dividing subjects evenly
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between the two treatments. However, the researcher is concerned with balancing
the expected power of the test against the expected benefit to participants, and
so faces the objective function


ρ(1 − ρ) n
max 
(1 − α)

ρ

σ



∞

∫

−∞

∞


µ dF (µ | ζ ) + αρ ∫ µdF (µ | ζ )
.


−∞


(20)

∫ µdF (µ | ζ ) .
∫ µ dF (µ | ζ )

(21)

The solution, ρ*, satisfies
−

(1 − 2ρ * )
2 ρ * (1 − ρ * )

=

ασ
(1 − α) n

The left (L) and right (R) hand sides of (21) are plotted in Figure 3. If there is
no signal, then E [ µ ] = 0 and ρ*=0.5. However, given a signal sufficiently
promising to induce the researcher to conduct the trial in the first place, the right
hand side is strictly positive, so that ρ*>0.5. Perhaps surprisingly, increases in σ
and reductions in n shift R up and induce the researcher to increase the fraction
of subjects, ρ*, receiving the innovative treatment. When there is little variation
in outcomes across individuals or the sample size is larger, researchers get more
“bang for their buck” in terms of increased power upon keeping ρ close to 0.5.
Finally, a mean preserving spread in the researcher’s posterior distribution raises

∫

µ dF (µ | ζ ) , shifts R downwards, and therefore reduces ρ*. Thus, if two

researchers have the same posterior mean for µ, then the researcher with the
greater confidence in this expectation will choose to raise the fraction of subjects
receiving the innovative treatment by the greater amount.

V. Conclusions
Selection by participants into clinical trials may lead to ex ante therapeutic
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R
0

ρ∗

0.5

1

ρ

FIGURE 3. Solution to (21)

misconception and ex post disappointment on the part of subjects. Selection by
researchers into clinical trials is incompatible with maintaining collective and
individual equipoise, and implies that balanced randomization is unethical. In
this paper, we explore both of these situations, and propose solutions for both.
For research participants, disappointment and therapeutic misconception
may always exist, and may be exacerbated by individual characteristics. We find
that when individuals are overconfident in the signals that they receive
concerning the benefits of trial participation, therapeutic misconception and
disappointment are increased. Unfortunately, little empirical evidence exists as to
which other individual characteristics affect the therapeutic misconception. Lidz
and Appelbaum [2002] review the literature, and report that some studies have
linked age and education to understanding of trial procedures, and illness severity
with attributing therapeutic goals to non-therapeutic research. However, no
studies

appear

to

directly

measure
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a

relationship

between

individual

characteristics and either misconception or disappointment.
When the therapeutic misconception and/or disappointment are induced in
trial participants, the trial – and research as a whole – may suffer. Individuals
may drop out of trials if they become aware of their misconception, and may
then hold, and spread, a distrust of clinical research. It is because of this, and the
ethical requirement of respect for persons, that researchers and ethicists try to
devise ways of reducing therapeutic misconception. Education and more extensive
informed consent do not appear to work. Here, we propose a nontrivial payment
as a means of ameliorating therapeutic misconception and disappointment. This
is not an entirely new idea, as the National Institutes of Health Section on
Human Subjects Research in 2002 proposed “evaluating the possibility of an
inverse relationship between money for research participation and the therapeutic
misconception.” (Grady et al. [2002]). Findings from this research may eventually
yield data that supports our claims here.
Selection by researchers when deciding which trials to conduct may also have
substantial ethical and practical implications for conducting clinical trials. If, as
we argue, research select into trials due to private information, and collective
equipoise is an important ethical criteria for conducting a trial, then maximizing
statistical power with equal samples appears unethical. This as well is not a new
idea. Acknowledging that individual equipoise is unlikely in most clinical trials,
others have also argued that a unbalanced sample may be useful for enhancing
the ethical design of human subjects research (Avins [1998], Edwards and
Braunholtz [2000]). The specific weights that one should give to current benefits
for participants and future benefits to society will be difficult to calculate, and
may vary with a number of characteristics of a specific research project. Such a
calculation is outside of the realm of formal economic analysis, but empirical
23

psychological and ethical research may reveal approximate figures.
Because of the long and continuing debates over both the therapeutic
misconception and equipoise, formalization of these concepts, as we have done
here, seems long overdue. The predictions generated by our model should inform
future empirical research in this area.
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